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Abstract 
What are the politics of, and prospects for, contemporary weapons control? Human rights 
and humanitarian activists and scholars celebrate the gains made in the UN Arms Trade 
Treaty as a step towards greater human security. Critics counter that the treaty 
represents an accommodation with global militarism. Taking the tensions between arms 
transfer control and militarism as my starting point, I argue that the negotiating process 
and eventual treaty text demonstrate competing modes of militarism. Expressed in terms 
of sovereignty, political economy, or human security, all three modes are underpinned by 
ongoing imperial relations: racial, gendered and classed relations of asymmetry and 
hierarchy that persist despite formal sovereign equality. This means human security is a 
form of militarism rather than the antithesis of it. Drawing on primary sources from 
negotiations and participant observation with actors involved in the campaign for the 
ATT, the argument challenges the idea that human security has scored a victory over 
militarism. It also complicates our understanding of the nature of the accommodation 
with it, demonstrating the transformation as well as entrenchment of contemporary 
militarism. The argument reframes the challenges for controlling weapons circulation, 
placing the necessity for feminist, postcolonial anti-militarist critique front and centre. 
Keywords: arms control; arms trade; gender; human security; imperial relations; 
militarism. 
 
 
At a time when the misuse of weapons is increasingly visible in human rights 
violations, breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL), terrorism, war and armed 
violence around the world, the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) provides, for many, a 
glimmer of hope. The ATT represents the apogee of over two decades of diplomacy, 
advocacy and campaigning by a North-South coalition of small and medium-sized states 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The treaty has been widely celebrated as a 
step forward in humanitarian arms control and a victory for human security, given its 
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goal of reducing human suffering, and the inclusion of IHL and human rights standards in 
its provisions. Scholar and practitioner proponents hope that the treaty will “diminish 
the human cost of the poorly regulated arms trade,” 1  with the effect of “humanizing 
international security.”2 Since its entry into force in December 2014 though, the signs 
have not been encouraging. Controversy over exports by the UK, an ATT State Party, to 
Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners for use in the war in Yemen, as well as the 
challenges of engaging states not party to the treaty there and in cases such as the war in 
Syria, are just the most politically prominent cases (in western debates, at least) of the 
human cost of war and of the challenges facing the ATT.  
This article inquires into the significance of the ATT for controlling weapons 
circulation. Most of the emerging academic literature on the treaty situates it as part of 
the post-Cold War trend of humanitarian arms control, prioritising human security over 
state security, or at least making them complementary. Such accounts draw on and 
extend disarmament efforts to ban specific weapons technologies (landmines, cluster 
munitions and nuclear weapons) and control efforts to regulate others (small arms and 
light weapons (SALW)). Critics, meanwhile, argue that the ATT represents an 
accommodation with global or liberal militarism. In this article I take the tensions 
between arms transfer control and militarism as my starting point, arguing that the 
negotiating process and eventual text of the ATT demonstrate the competing modes of 
militarism in play in the contemporary, postcolonial world. These different modes of 
militarism are expressed in terms of sovereignty, political economy, or human security, 
and are all underpinned by ongoing imperial relations: racial, gendered and classed 
relations of asymmetry and hierarchy that persist despite formal sovereign equality in 
the UN system in which arms trade regulation is negotiated. This means seeing human 
security as a form of militarism rather than the antithesis of it: circumscribed by liberal 
conceptions of human rights and IHL, but with little to say about intra-western arms 
transfers, global military spending or the entrenchment of military interests in societies 
and economies around the world, and with little political force to counter allegations of 
hypocrisy due to controversial transfers or double standards. Such an argument 
challenges the idea that the human security agenda has been a victory over militarism, 
                                                          
1 Daniel Mack, ‘The Arms Trade Treaty PrepCom: Prepared and Committed?’ Arms Control Today, Volume 
40, July/ August 2010. 
2 Denise Garcia, ‘Humanitarian Security Regimes,’ International Affairs 91:1 (2015), pp. 55-75. 
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and complicates our understanding of the nature of the accommodation with it, 
demonstrating the transformation as well as entrenchment of contemporary militarism. 
The argument also reframes the challenge facing weapons control, placing the necessity 
for feminist, post-colonial anti-militarist critique front and centre.  
The argument unfolds in three steps. First, I outline the debate between 
proponents of humanitarian arms control and human security, and critics who focus on 
militarism. Second, I trace the transformation of human security over time in relation to 
weapons issues, arguing that the scholarship on the arms trade and on human security 
need to both foreground feminist critiques of militarism and post-colonial critiques of 
international politics, to counter the dominant trends of optimism and presentism, and 
benevolent and linear accounts of history. Third, I outline three competing modes of 
militarism expressed in terms of sovereignty, political economy and human security, and 
illustrate their contestation through three controversies and one silence that structured 
the ATT negotiations and eventual text. The controversies relate to the definition of the 
illicit trade; the treatment of human rights and IHL; and diversion and the treatment of 
ammunition. The silence is around domestic procurement and civilian possession, both 
of which are excluded from the international regulatory agenda. The research is based on 
close reading of primary sources from states, organisations, research institutes and NGOs 
involved in the campaign,3 combined with participant observation work with pro-control 
NGOs4 and at ATT negotiation, implementation and training events. 
Humanitarian Arms Control, Human Security and their Critics   
Adopted by a majority vote at the United Nations General Assembly in April 2013 
(154 in favour, 3 against, 23 abstentions), the ATT entered into force on 24 December 
2014 once 50 states had ratified it. There are 130 signatories to the treaty, of which 94 
are States Parties at the time of writing. It aims to “[e]stablish the highest possible 
common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the 
international trade in conventional arms” and “[p]revent and eradicate the illicit trade in 
                                                          
3 e.g. Armstreaty.org, http://armstreaty.org/; Arms Trade Treaty Legal blog 
http://armstradetreaty.blogspot.co.uk/; ATT Monitor blog, http://attmonitor.blogspot.co.uk/; Reaching 
Critical Will, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/att. 
4 The Control Arms coalition led the civil society campaign for the ATT. Their activism was contested by the 
US National Rifle Association (NRA) and World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA). 
On pro-gun civil society activism, see Clifford Bob, The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)  
4 
 
conventional arms and prevent their diversion.”5 To do this, the treaty text sets out the 
core provisions that States Parties must implement in their national regulatory systems 
governing the transfer – import, export, transit, trans-shipment or brokering – of 
weapons ranging from battle tanks and combat aircraft, to SALW. A set of prohibitions 
based on existing international law stipulate that States Parties must not authorise 
transfers if doing so would violate UN Security Council arms embargoes or be used in 
genocide or war crimes. If a transfer is not prohibited in this way, States Parties must 
conduct a risk assessment against a series of factors, including human rights, IHL, 
terrorism and transnational organized crime, to decide whether or not to authorize 
exports.  
The ATT is in many ways the epitome of post-Cold War humanitarian arms control 
and the broader human security agenda. The purpose of reducing human suffering, the 
inclusion of IHL and human rights in the operative provisions of the treaty and of SALW 
in the scope of weapons to be regulated, as well as the landmark inclusion of gender-
based violence (GBV) as an issue States Parties must take account of when approving 
weapons exports, all point to the ways in which human security and humanitarian arms 
control attempt to protect individuals in war and in situations of armed violence. Key 
features of the negotiating process – the role of small and middle powers, and civil 
society; and the challenges posed to the sclerotic UN negotiating machinery – resonate 
with the global governance elements of previous human security-related weapons 
campaigns against landmines, cluster munitions and SALW.6 Indeed, Erickson describes 
the process as a “marriage between traditional security and human security begun by the 
landmine campaign.”7 
Activists and scholars have attempted to elevate human rights and humanitarian 
concerns for the broad swathe of the world’s population above the political economy and 
                                                          
5  United Nations, The Arms Trade Treaty, 2013, Article 1; https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf   
6  See e.g. John Borrie, ‘The “Long Year”: Emerging International Efforts to address the Humanitarian 
Impacts of Cluster Munitions, 2006-2007,’ Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 10 (2007), pp. 251-
275; Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson and Brian W. Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear. The Global 
Movement to Ban Landmines (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Keith Krause, ‘Multilateral 
Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons,’ Global 
Governance, 8 (2002), pp. 247-263. 
7 Jennifer Erickson, Dangerous Trade. Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015), p.62 
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security interests of states and arms-producing companies. Weapons-specific initiatives 
such as the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions had shown 
the impact that a humanitarian framing can have in relation to particular technologies. 
The negotiation of the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects showed the challenge of 
applying human security principles to weapons with legitimate military and security uses 
– a challenge that was to resurface during the ATT negotiations. Regulating the 
conventional arms trade as a whole cannot take a purely disarmament or humanitarian 
frame, given its deeply entrenched legitimacy. This makes the ATT a human security 
initiative rather than a primarily humanitarian arms control or disarmament one 8  – 
whilst it has the reduction of human suffering as a named purpose, this sits alongside 
“international and regional peace, security and stability” in Article 1 of the text.  As Martin 
and Owen put it, “The idea of arms control is appealing to proponents of human security 
because it sets out to control tools of violence, as well as seeking to curb the dominance 
of the state in determining the forms of insecurity to which policy solutions must be 
found.”9 Jody Williams, founding coordinator of the ICBL, calls on governments and civil 
society to work together, including on initiatives like the ATT, “to advance human security 
as a viable alternative to militarism and violence and war.”10 
Sympathetic criticism of the ATT has been aired from within the academic and 
scholar-practitioner community. Bolton and James argue that the treaty represents a 
“melding” of a “‘maximalist’ human security–civil society approach with concerns of 
developing countries and the ‘minimalist’ strategic and commercial interests of the major 
arms exporters.”11 Chinkin and Kaldor argue that “the humanitarian achievements” of 
post-Cold War weapons control “need to be complemented by disarmament.” That is, as 
                                                          
8 An absolute ban, requirement for remedial measures, and cooperative approach to implementation are 
what mark out humanitarian disarmament initiatives from other control measures. Bonnie Docherty, 
‘Ending Civilian Suffering: The Purpose, Provisions, and Promise of Humanitarian Disarmament Law,’ 
Austrian Review of International and European Law, 15 (2010), pp. 7-8. 
9  Mary Martin and Taylor Owens, ‘Introduction,’ in ibid. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Human Security 
(London: Routledge, 2014), p9. For an example of this view, see Deepayan Basu Ray, ‘Navigating the 
“national security” barrier: a human security agenda for arms control in the twenty-first century,’ in Martin 
and Owens, Routledge Handbook of Human Security, pp.197-209.  
10 Jody Williams, ‘New Approaches in a Changing World: The Human Security Agenda,’ in Jody Williams, 
Stephen D. Goose, Mary Wareham (eds.) Banning Landmines. Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human 
Security (Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), p. 294 
11 Matthew Bolton and Katelyn E. James, ‘Nascent Spirit of New York or Ghost of Arms Control Past? The 
Normative Implications of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global Policymaking,’ Global Policy, 5:4 (2014), p2. 
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well as “bringing states’ human rights obligations into the heart of weapons control,” 
human security requires “the reduction of existing weapon stocks and prohibition of the 
development, production and stockpiling of further weapons.”12 Such a call echoes the 
demand of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), one of the 
civil society organisations active on the ATT, for disarmament as a long-standing, yet 
marginalised feminist concern.13  
Others have been less sympathetically critical. For Cooper, initiatives like the ATT 
“do not represent a novel post-Cold War development that symbolizes progress on an 
emancipatory human security agenda.”14 Post-Cold War arms trade regulation has been 
based on a “discourse around humanitarianism, human security and weapons precision” 
that has served to legitimize high-tech military technologies. 15  Cooper and others 
emphasise the deep historical roots of the way humanitarian impulses intersect with 
economic and security ones, including in late nineteenth century efforts to regulate the 
supply and circulation of weapons in the imperial peripheries that are remarkably 
resonant with contemporary efforts. 16  Historically minded scholars remind us that 
surplus and obsolete weapons have long circulated in the peripheries of empire, and new 
weapons tested there; and political authorities were licensing weapons exports as early 
as the 16th century – in part to avoid blowback.17 Arms trade regulation, then, has a 
“historically contingent” character, marked by the ongoing importance of “power, 
interest, economy, security.”18  
                                                          
12 Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor, International Law and New Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), ch. 7 
13 WILPF, WILPF Manifesto 2015, https://wilpf.org/wilpf_publications/wilpf-2015-manifesto/; J. Ann 
Tickner and Jacqui True, ‘A century of international relations feminism: From World War I women’s peace 
pragmatism to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,’ International Studies Quarterly, 2018, 1-13.  
14 Neil Cooper, ‘Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes of Securitization: Moving Weapons Along the 
Security Continuum,’ Contemporary Security Policy 32:1 (2011), pp. 134-158; and Neil Cooper, ‘Race, 
sovereignty and free trade: Arms trade regulation and humanitarian arms control in the age of empire,’ 
Journal of Global Security Studies, 2018 forthcoming.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Mark Bromley, Neil Cooper and Paul Holtom, ‘The UN Arms Trade Treaty: arms export controls, the 
human security agenda and the lessons of history,’ International Affairs 88: 5 (2012), p.1031; David R. 
Stone, ‘Imperialism and Sovereignty: The League of Nations’ Drive to Control the Global Arms Trade,’ 
Journal of Contemporary History, 35:2 (2000), pp. 213-230.  
17 Emrys Chew, Arming the Periphery. The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012); Lina Grip, ‘History Never Repeats? Imports, Impact and Control of Small 
Arms in Africa,’ Contemporary Security Policy, 36:1 (2015), pp. 79-103. 
18 Cooper, ‘Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes of Securitization,’ p. 154. 
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Militarism emerges as a core concern out of such critiques and provides the 
jumping off point for this analysis. In particular, there are long traditions of historical 
sociological and feminist scholarship on militarism,19  defined here as “the social and 
international relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, organized political 
violence.”20 In relation to arms control, I have argued elsewhere that the ATT has been 
mobilised by liberal democratic states primarily to legitimise their arms transfer 
practices. 21  And Cooper concludes that “campaigners need to return to a strategic 
contestation of global militarism rather than searching for tactical campaign victories 
dependent on accommodation with the language and economic and security paradigms 
of contemporary military humanism.”22 This is part of a political economy critique of the 
way “the regulation of pariah weapons might alternatively be described as ‘arms control 
from below within the logic of militarism from above’,”23 in line with a wider critique of 
human security as having been “institutionalised and co-opted to work in the interests of 
global capitalism, militarism and neoliberal governance.” 24  Cooper and Mutimer, 
surveying the history of and prospects for controlling the means of violence, argue that 
“the longer term, indirect effect should be to reduce militarism and promote cultures of 
peace” or “at the very least, avoid further embedding cultures of militarism.”25 How, then, 
should we think about the impact of the human security agenda on militarism, and vice 
versa; and what are the ramifications for weapons control?  
From militarism to human security – and back via the imperial turn  
                                                          
19  E.g. Cynthia Cockburn, ‘Gender relations as causal in militarization and war,’ International Feminist 
Journal of Politics, 12:2 (2010); Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives 
(London: Pandora Press, 1988); Michael Mann, ‘The roots and contradictions of modern militarism,’ New 
Left Review I:162 (1987), pp. 35–50; Martin Shaw, Post-Military Society. Militarism, Demilitarization and 
War at the End of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Policy Press, 1991); Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via 
(eds.) Gender, War and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives (Praeger: Santa Barbara, 2010). 
20 Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby, ‘Militarism and international relations in the 21st century,’ in ibid. 
(eds.) Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security, Theory (London: Routledge, 
2013), p. 3. 
21 Anna Stavrianakis, ‘Legitimizing Liberal Militarism: Politics, Law and War in the Arms Trade Treaty,’ 
Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), pp. 840-865 
22 Cooper, ‘Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes of Securitization,’ p. 154.  
23 Mandy Turner, Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh, ‘Institutionalised and co-opted: Why human security has 
lost its way,’ in David Chandler and Nik Hynek (eds.) Critical Perspectives on Human Security. Rethinking 
Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2010), p. p87.  
24 Ibid. p.83.    
25 Neil Cooper and David Mutimer, ‘Arms Control for the 21st Century: Controlling the Means of Violence,’ 
Contemporary Security Policy, 32:1 (2011), pp. 11-12.  
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The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which formalised the human 
security agenda, was explicit about the role of “excessive militarization and the 
international arms trade” as a “critical source of insecurity.”26 Arising from “the world's 
previous preoccupation with deterrence and territorial security,” arms transfers, military 
assistance, proxy wars, excessive military spending, politicised militaries in developing 
countries, and the military-industrial complex, were all identified as impediments to the 
realisation of human security.27 The report identified concrete policy recommendations, 
including an international agreement to phase out military assistance; a list of prohibited 
items for transfer; a strengthened UN Register reporting system; the regulation and 
elimination of subsidies; and a tax on arms sales to finance peacekeeping.28 Such moves, 
alongside increased spending on demilitarisation efforts, were envisaged as “an 
important step towards achieving human security.”29 Whilst there was an emphasis on 
“Third World disarmament,” the report was clear that this must be one component of a 
“blueprint for global disarmament.”30  
So here we have an agenda for practical action on the weapons trade, challenging 
militarism to improve human security. The UNDP report identified the nation-statist 
ideologies of deterrence and territorial security, as well as the transnational practices of 
military assistance and proxy wars, as key causes of insecurity. Simultaneously, it 
reopened the debate about the link between security and development “that had been 
closed since the somewhat sterile polemic around the link between disarmament and 
development” of the 1970s and 1980s.31 This earlier, now ostensibly outdated debate 
surmised that “the North (i.e. both sides of the East-West conflict) should disarm, and 
devote the resources freed up by arms reduction to development in the South.”32 As part 
of this shift in debate, the move away from state-centred definitions of security was 
accompanied by an acknowledgment of the legitimate and crucial role of the state in 
providing security – especially as security was emphasised as a precondition for 
development. So the anti-militarist call that identified the state as a creator of insecurity 
                                                          
26 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 40.  
27 Ibid., ch. 3.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Oscar Arias, ‘A Global Demilitarization Fund,’ in UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, p.59 
30 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, p.58  
31  Keith Krause, ‘Critical Perspectives on Human Security,’ in Mary Martin and Taylor Owen (eds.)  
Routledge Handbook of Human Security (London: Routledge, 2014) p.79 
32 Ibid.  
9 
 
was balanced against recognition of the legitimate role of the state in providing security. 
There was also a downgrading of military threats as a particular type of threat to human 
security: military threats do not appear as one of the seven main categories articulated in 
the report (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, political). 
Rather, threats from war (defined as “Threats from other states”) are listed under the 
category of “personal security”, alongside threats of physical torture and ethnic tension, 
as well as crime, rape, domestic violence, and suicide.33  
The analytical and political move made in the 1994 UNDP Report was to equate 
war with the state and move away from a concern with territorially-based definitions of 
security and inter-state war, which it equates with militarism. There is a shift in focus to 
the spectrum of armed violence and non-conflict violence, which are to be remedied in 
the name of human security, in part through the (re)construction of legitimate coercive 
apparatuses. The shift away from militarism and towards human security claims to 
acknowledge the changing character of conflict and the role of the state in monopolizing 
legitimate violence, without privileging it unthinkingly. Research in this vein has 
flourished in the years since the 1994 report, and brings significant advantages to bear 
over traditional state-centric analyses, such as the ability to account for the geographical 
diversity of rates of armed violence within as well as between states; sustained and 
distinct attention to gendered patterns of violence, including the specific character of 
femicide as a distinct form of violence; and the incorporation of questions of public health 
and socio-economic inequality into discussion about weapons transfers.34  
For all these developments, the human security agenda’s take on war, conflict and 
armed violence has not been without its critics. It has been described as the “new 
orthodoxy” that is “unable to provide the basis for a substantive change of the system of 
international security,” despite finding “the old language of interstate war and conflict … 
lacking.” 35  Similarly, its emphasis on “progressive” initiatives such as “eliminat[ing] 
certain types of weapons” stands accused of failing to adequately examine “the 
                                                          
33 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, p. 30. 
34 e.g. Vanessa Farr, Henry Myrttinen and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.) Sexed Pistols: The gendered impacts of 
small arms and light weapons (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009); Geneva Declaration, Global 
Burden of Armed Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 2015); Robert Muggah and Keith 
Krause, 'Closing the Gap Between Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Insecurity: Towards a Violence 
Reduction Agenda', International Peacekeeping, 16:1 (2009), pp. 136-150 
35 Ryerson Christie, ‘Critical voices and human security: To endure, to endanger or to critique?’ Security 
Dialogue, 41:2 (2010), pp. 169, 172.   
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pathologies inherent in the structure of the international system” that generate such 
challenges.36 And when the “human” in human security is naturalised as masculine, the 
inclusion of novel threats and new actors leaves the parameters of security untouched, 
meaning that “state-based, militarised security remains unchallenged.” 37  Feminist 
scholars have critiqued the gendered concepts and practices of war, peace, militarization, 
peacekeeping and soldiering, going well beyond the human security framework in the 
process.38 
Feminist critiques that challenge the parameters of human security can usefully 
be combined with postcolonial accounts of IR that emphasise the ways in which the 
discipline “can both deny empire while simultaneously normalizing an imperial 
perspective on the world.”39 Some of the main themes of the human security agenda are 
illustrative of the need for an imperial perspective in how we understand the challenges 
facing weapons control. By this I mean interpreting them with the aid of scholarship that 
challenges methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism in its analysis, mobilises 
feminist critiques of militarism, and puts the legacy of empire and colonialism, and the 
racial, gendered and classed politics of imperial control, front and centre in its assessment 
of contemporary challenges.40 Deploying such resources  gives us a chance to rethink 
some of the key assumptions around human security and the prospects for regulating 
weapons circulation.  
                                                          
36 Edward Newman, ‘Critical human security studies,’ Review of International Studies, 36:1 (2010), p. 93.  
37 Annick T.R. Wibben, ‘The promise and dangers of human security,’ in Jonna Nyman and Anthony Burke 
(eds.), Ethical Security Studies: A New Research Agenda (London: Routledge ,2016), p.107 
38 Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Toward a Gender Perspective on Human Security,’ in Aili Mari Tripp, Myra Marx Ferree 
and Christina Ewig (eds.) Gender, Violence, and Human Security: Critical Feminist Perspectives (New York: 
NYU Press, 2013), p10  
39 Tarak Barkawi, ‘Empire and Order in international relations and security studies,’ in Robert A. Denemark 
(ed.) The International Studies Encyclopedia (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), pp. 1360-1379; also 
Branwen Gruffydd Jones, ‘”Good governance” and “state failure”: genealogies of imperial discourse,’ 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1 (2013), pp. 49-70.  
40 On weapons issues specifically, see Shampa Biswas, Nuclear Desire. Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear 
Order (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Ritu Mathur, ‘Sly civility and the paradox of 
equality/inequality in the nuclear order: a post-colonial critique,’ Critical Studies on Security, 4:1 (2016), 
pp. 57-72. More widely, see e.g.  Gurminder Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity. Postcolonialism and the 
Sociological Imagination (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Julian Go, ‘For a postcolonial sociology,’ 
Theory and Society, 42:1 (2013), pp. 25-55; A.G Hopkins, ‘Back to the Future: From National History to 
Imperial History', Past and Present, 164 (1999): pp.198-243; Amina Mama and Margo Okazawa-Rey, 
‘Militarism, conflict and women’s activism in the global era: challenges and prospects for women in three 
West African contexts,’ Feminist Review, 101 (2012), pp.97-123.  
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Three core themes of the human security agenda are ripe for an imperial critique. 
First, the claim that the character of conflict has changed, from inter-state war towards 
internal conflict, has become axiomatic in much of IR, including the human security 
literature.41 The greatest threats to human security are deemed to stem from internal 
conflict and criminal violence, or the state itself, rather than from an external adversary 
as per the traditional security agenda. As such, “international security traditionally 
defined – territorial integrity – does not necessarily correlate with human security.”42 
Second, the changing character of conflict requires a shift in the referent object of 
security, according to the human security agenda: away from the state and inter-state 
war, and towards the individual and the broader range of threats they face. 43 And third, 
the human security agenda nonetheless emphasises the importance of the state’s 
monopoly on legitimate violence and role in security provision.44 Yet the circumstances 
have been transformed with the end of the Cold War. Kaldor attributes a “profound 
restructuring of political authority” to the new wars, and sees human security as an 
opportunity for “reconstructing political authority in the context of the processes we call 
globalisation.” 45  Hence the need for security sector reform (SSR), demobilisation, 
disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and other reforms of coercive practices and 
apparatuses. 
Each of these three themes is premised on the significance of the rupture that 
occurred with the end of the Cold War. But understanding the Cold War as predominantly 
an East-West ideological and geopolitical confrontation marginalises longer historical 
patterns of North-South power relations and conflict, and of hot war in the South.  And 
the increased focus on internal conflict, whilst fruitful in terms of changing the scale of 
analysis, risks disconnecting the micro-politics of violence from broader systems and 
structures of war preparation, ignoring one of the key lessons of feminist scholarship, 
which is that the scales or so-called levels of analysis are interdependent. As Sjoberg and 
                                                          
41 The key figure here is Mary Kaldor, central to both the new wars literature and the human security 
agenda. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era (Redwood City: Stanford 
University Press, 1999); Mary Kaldor, ‘What is human security?’ in David Held (ed.) Debating Globalization 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 175-190.  
42 Newman, ‘Critical human security studies,’ p.79   
43 Ramesh Thakur, ‘A Political Worldview,’ Security Dialogue, 35(3): 2004, p347 
44 Newman, ‘Critical human security studies,’ p.79   
45 Mary Kaldor, ‘Human Security: Political Authority in a Global Era,’ in Martin and Owen (eds.) Routledge 
Handbook of Human Security, pp.66, 68 
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Via put it, “absolutely distinguishing between the personal, national and international 
level of war and militarism lacks conceptual and empirical rigor at best”: feminist 
attention allows us to understand both the impact of war and militarism on people 
(especially, but not only, women) as well as the gendered construction of war and 
militarism.46  
A longer historical view that is not hamstrung by a state-centric ontology allows 
us to see that arms transfer practices have long been part of the simultaneously 
transnational and asymmetrical constitution of force. Historical scholarship on the arms 
trade emphasises the importance of decolonization as the shift from empire to a system 
of formally sovereign states in which North-South power asymmetries continue to 
resonate. One of the key transformations in weapons transfer practices that came with 
decolonization was a shift on the part of the Soviet Union and China from support for 
national liberation movements, to the defence of sovereignty as a means of resisting US-
led domination, in either anti-capitalist or anti-imperialist modes. 47  The supply of 
weapons and military training was a common feature of both Soviet and US relations with 
the Third World: despite their differences, North-South politico-military relations had 
much in common between the two blocs.48  
Ostensibly new or transformed challenges of the post-Cold War era, such as Somali 
piracy, new wars in Africa, or insurgency and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, are thus 
better understood in postcolonial terms, with militarised transnational continuities as 
well as changes associated with the end of superpower rivalry.49 Mama and Okazawa-Rey 
emphasise the continuities between colonial and contemporary militarism that not only 
lead them to prefer the terminology of postcolonial conflicts over that of new wars, but 
also emphasise the fundamentally gendered characteristics of the physical and structural 
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violence at stake.50 And as Cooper argues, arms control regimes have long featured both 
“proscription and permission” 51  operating in tandem, challenging the optimism of 
accounts premised on the end of the Cold War as the changed permissive factor that 
allows humanitarian concerns to be the core objective of weapons control. This emphasis 
on history and power generates scepticism about the optimism and presentism of most 
accounts of the emergence of the ATT, and the linear, benevolent account of history found 
therein.52 A longer historical perspective allows us to see how state security (whether 
national or imperial) and (what is today called) human security have long been two sides 
of the same coin. 
 There are thus continuities of imperial forms of practice despite the turn to formal 
sovereignty. A focus on the systematic or organised and North-South character of much 
armed violence is not to return to Cold War politics or the “sterile polemic” of past 
debates about weapons issues mentioned earlier. Rather, it is to emphasise that historical 
weapons supply routes and power relations continue to resonate; that massive and 
uneven levels of global military spending and proxy wars continue to matter; and that 
clients continue to use weapons in ways that are often unanticipated by patrons. 
Ostensibly civil or internal wars are enmeshed in wider regional and international 
projects.53 There are internationalised sources of much of what counts as domestic, civil 
or intra-state, including colonial legacies and internationalised weapons supply chains.   
In many accounts, human security has been mobilised as an attempt to “cope with [the] 
pathological results” of how security has been defined in post-colonial states in the 
South.54 Yet this encourages internalist analysis that sees the problems of armed violence 
as having their sources primarily within the global South. In conceding the terms of 
debate to “traditional” security studies, and seeking to shift inwards from the state to the 
individuals living within it, rather than critiquing the conception of the international 
system, the human security agenda continues to “occlude and distort imperial relations” 
in the way that more traditional “Westphalian terms of reference” do.55 
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In the human security agenda’s account of the shift from wars between states to 
wars within them, war falls off the agenda as it is deemed analytically outdated and 
politically regressive. Yet neo-realist, Cold War accounts of national security were never 
adequate, and in trying to overcome them, many human security accounts take them at 
face value and get the critique wrong. With its emphasis on the enduring power of war 
preparation, the concept of militarism suggests that much contemporary violence 
remains coordinated or facilitated (by state, paramilitary, militia or other organised 
actors), and systematic within society, despite the shift towards discussion of armed 
violence and intentional homicide, which is suggestive of disorganised violence. So how 
are we to mobilise the concept of militarism in light of the imperial turn, in ways that help 
us think more productively about weapons control?  
First is to defend the use of the concept at all. According to Mary Kaldor, the 
concept of militarism has outlived its usefulness as it is “drawn from the Cold War and 
before:” the changes with the end of the Cold War necessitate new terms.56 To capture 
the ways that organised violence blurs state/non-state and national/foreign boundaries, 
whether in the form of paramilitary groups, organised crime or terrorist cells, or in the 
form of peacekeeping troops, Kaldor coins the terms “Netforce” and “Protectionforce” 
respectively.57 She restricts the concept of militarism to “the new American militarism” 
and the “neo-modern militarism” (“the evolution of classical military forces in large 
transition states” practising inter-state war or counter-insurgency) of states such as 
Russia, China and India.58 But in differentiating some types of organised violence as not-
militarism, we lose the opportunity to compare them, to see the overlaps, similarities and 
differences in modes of organised violence. Feminists have long been able to capture this 
with the concept of militarism, showing us that “it is not quite so easy to set aside 
‘ordinary’ aggression, force or violence as ‘not war’”59 – especially when we pay attention 
to the experience of violence in the global South.60 
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Second, and relatedly, the specificities of combinations of actors, degrees of state 
support, and so on, are subject to empirical and historical specificity, and a common 
rubric of militarism helps us understand similarities and differences between them.  
Working in a historical sociological tradition, Mabee and Vucetic draw up a typology of 
forms of contemporary militarism. 61  They contrast Michael Mann’s concept of civil 
society militarism - “the use of organized military violence in pursuit of social goals that 
is ‘state-supported, but not state-led’” 62  - to “nation-state militarism” in both its 
authoritarian and liberal forms; to “neoliberal militarism” structured around socio-
economic liberalisation; and to “exceptionalist militarism” seen in practices associated 
with the War on Terror.  Feminists tend not to operate in such formal typological ways, 
but have  long been articulating the idea of war and militarism as a spectrum or a system, 
in which the forms, intensities and characteristics may vary, but the gendered basis of 
violence is central.63 And a focus on militarism can be usefully mobilised to consider the 
connections and feedback loops between Northern and Southern practices, giving a more 
internationalised account that is better attuned to the operation of power in contexts of 
armed violence. Indeed, Abrahamsen refers to “global militarism in Africa” because 
“while militarism is always specific (and often national), it is also simultaneously global,” 
and the analytical challenge is to capture at one and the same time the global and the 
local, and their intersection in particular locations.”64 
Third, whilst I want to defend the concept, and think about types of militarism in 
relation to each other, it is crucial to acknowledge that contemporary militarism and 
human security have shaped each other in the last twenty years. Human security, with its 
emphasis on human rights and IHL, has become a mediating element in the relation 
between war and society. Post-Cold War processes of democratisation have “often 
coincided with new forms of militarism” that tend to be analysed under the rubric of 
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policy-oriented concepts such as security sector reform.65 As Abrahamsen argues, “The 
securitization of underdevelopment … is the condition of possibility for a global 
militarism justified in the name of human security and development.”66 We must take 
heed of Abrahamsen’s warning that “Paradoxically, transformations that initially entailed 
a critique of militarization and militarism have ended up according a new importance to 
security actors and laying the groundwork for new expressions of militarization and 
militarism.”67 Human security has – against its self-image as a progressive social force – 
facilitated a resurgent as well as transformed militarism.  
Controversies and Silences in the Arms Trade Treaty  
Having thought through the relationship between militarism and human security, 
I turn now to the specifics of the ATT and the ramifications for weapons control. The 
impetus for the ATT lay in the human security agenda. The call for a treaty to regulate the 
arms trade came from a coalition of NGOs who, allied with a group of Nobel Peace 
Laureates led by former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, mobilised states and civil 
society from Europe, Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America to push for the treaty via the 
UN. Their goal was a treaty that would provide a framework for reducing the number of 
lives lost and damaged through un- or under-regulated arms transfers that exacerbate 
conflict, armed violence and organised crime. They won several victories during the 
drafting of the treaty: the inclusion of the reduction of human suffering in its object and 
purpose; the mention of “armed violence” as well as “armed conflict” in the Preamble, 
which broadens the obligations on states beyond legal definitions of conflict; the first 
inclusion of GBV as a criterion in an international treaty; and the inclusion of SALW in the 
scope of the treaty. 
Alongside the human security agenda, many states – including some of the treaty’s 
strongest proponents – also articulated a political economy-based position on the 
purpose of the treaty. Encapsulated in the idea of levelling the playing field – creating 
common regulatory standards to prevent under-cutting – this vision sees weapons 
transfers in terms of defence-industrial policy and the political economy of the global 
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arms market. This is seen as compatible with human security: it provides “more 
economically based reasons for supporting the international, norm-building approach” 
associated with human security.68 EU member states expended significant energy trying 
to get the USA, as the world’s largest arms exporter, on board. And the UK, France and US, 
in particular, were keen to incorporate China and emerging Southern exporters into a 
common regulatory regime. Although not highly visible during the treaty negotiations, 
the arms industry of western states – for the most part formally (but not substantively) 
separate from the state, unlike in many non-western states – also took this position, on 
the basis that the treaty could bring “a definite comparative advantage to the defence 
industry.”69  
A third understanding of the ATT’s purpose is based on sovereignty: the concern 
that the treaty may hamper states’ ability to import weapons and transfer them as they 
see fit. This account was primarily articulated by Southern states, often with nationalised 
military industries. These include growing military producers such as China and Brazil; 
major importers such as India; regional antagonists such as Egypt, Israel, Pakistan and 
India; leftist Latin American states such as Venezuela and Cuba; and the three states that 
voted against the treaty, North Korea, Iran and Syria. Sovereignty was also a strong theme 
of the US position, however: weapons transfers are a “sovereign decision” premised on 
state’s right to engage in foreign policy as it sees fit, and its opposition to any overarching 
authority being able to tell states how to interpret the treaty.70 In this account, there is 
emphasis on states’ legitimate interests in trading materiel, equipment and technology 
for political, security, economic and commercial reasons.  
The human security, political economy and sovereignty orientations towards the 
control of weapons circulation demonstrate some of the variety of forms of militarism in 
the contemporary world. They do not map directly on to existing types but, as Mabee and 
Vucetic explain, this empirical diversity helps us to move away from primarily statist 
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conceptualisations of militarism. 71  Human security can be well described as an 
expression of liberal militarism, which features justifications for the use of force based on 
values and morals, accompanied by the use of law to legitimise it; a strong commitment 
to military production across war- and peacetime; and a capital- and technology-
intensive orientation to war preparation.72 Human security is thus organically linked to 
particular conceptions of political economy – as evidenced by the ostensible 
compatibility between the promotion of arms exports and support for human security as 
articulated by some states, noted above.  
Sovereigntist orientations towards the ATT are well encapsulated by the concept 
of nation-state militarism, often but not always authoritarian in form. Again, this has 
political economic dimensions – the “state-led economic and social mobilization of 
‘destructive’ forces”73 of nation-state militarism is reflected in the state ownership and 
direction of the arms industry in many states articulating a sovereigntist account of the 
treaty, and in the US position, where industry is formally private but arms exports are a 
matter of state policy. Often deemed retrograde, nation-state militarism “consistently 
reasserts itself and needs to be accounted for.”74  Its persistence should be read as a 
means of agency under conditions of hierarchy: in an officially equal but substantively 
unequal international system, marked by the ongoing legacies of colonial rule and 
contemporary practices of state formation and internal colonisation, the enduring power 
of sovereignty continues to occlude North-South relations, whether articulated by the 
USA or states of the global South.   
Given the different accounts of what the treaty was for, and as would be expected 
during any treaty negotiation, there was significant diplomatic contestation during the 
treaty process. While there was some fluidity between the positions, the trifecta of 
sovereignty, political economy and human security remains a useful heuristic for 
understanding the broad differences in orientation towards the treaty. In what follows, I 
identify three key controversies and one silence that shaped the eventual treaty text. I 
want to demonstrate that these issues go beyond diplomatic or technical contestation. 
Rather, they indicate deeply political processes in which different modes of 
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contemporary militarism – including one inflected by human security –  come into conflict 
over specific empirical issues.  
Defining the “illicit and unregulated” trade  
The ATT is designed to prevent and eradicate the “illicit and unregulated” trade in 
weapons. The term “illicit” is not defined in the treaty text, due to dispute over its 
meaning that has simultaneously facilitated and plagued multilateral action on weapons 
issues for over two decades.75 That is, the “illicit and unregulated” formulation is both the 
basis of any traction the treaty might have, and a key source of disagreement as to what 
the treaty means in practice. Major non-western weapons exporters (Russia and China) 
and importers (such as India and Middle Eastern states) most strongly articulated a 
narrow, legalistic, sovereignty-based position during negotiations. For them, illicit 
transfers are unauthorised transfers to non-state actors, in particular terrorists76 – a 
position based on their domestic battles over secession, territorial integrity and the 
monopoly on legitimate violence, and their foreign policy interest in supporting state 
sovereignty. For them, “illicit” means illegal, unlawful, or unauthorised.  
A variety of states specifically wanted a ban on transfers to non-state actors to be 
written into the treaty text as part of the illicit trade formulation. For states that 
articulated a sovereignty-based position, such as Russia, China and India, such a ban was 
an anti-terrorism necessity. All three abstained from the final vote on the treaty, citing 
the failure to include such a ban in relation to their own problems with non-state actors 
and the war in Syria.77  A handful of predominantly Latin American and Sub Saharan 
African states, meanwhile, who are predominantly importing or transit states and face 
problems of organised crime and armed violence, also wanted a ban.78 For such states, 
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transfers to non-state actors are the key problem of illicit trade, either for anti-terrorism, 
organized crime or armed violence reasons. 
States adopting a narrow position on the illicit trade reject criticism of their 
weapons transfer practices on two grounds. First, by pointing to the fact transfers are 
authorised: as an expression of state policy, they are, by definition, responsible. And 
second, by rebutting criticism from western actors (state or civil society) as politically 
motivated: they tended to view arguments about human rights and humanitarianism as 
a political tool of western states.79 In this, the ATT negotiations are fairly typical of the 
ways in which non-Western states are sceptical of initiatives that would threaten their 
sovereign status.  
They are also indicative of the ways that nation-state militarism is both 
masculinist and shot through with North-South relations: the emphasis on the 
weaponised defence of sovereignty by states who deem themselves disadvantaged within 
the international state system and capitalist global economy, are engaged in their own 
post-colonial or other battles over national territorial integrity, and/or resisting western 
domination and hypocrisy. As examples, the Indian delegation insisted on the exclusion 
of defence cooperation agreements from the provisions of the treaty80 and then abstained 
on the final vote on the treaty. The Chinese delegation, under pressure from the military, 
insisted on excluding military gifts from the definition of arms transfers,81 as a means of 
protecting military assistance and bilateral relations with other developing states. 
Several Southern states also insisted on the exclusion of any language of socio-economic 
development, and on the insertion of language of “objective and non-discriminatory” 
application of treaty criteria. States’ statements to the UN set out the context in which 
these demands make sense: fear that discriminatory and subjective criteria will be used 
as a tool of interference; opposition to western double standards and hypocrisy; concern 
that the ATT will be used as a means of curtailing the right to trade in arms and that law 
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will be used as cover for political decisions; fear of regime change; opposition to 
occupation and the use of force; and emphasis on asymmetry in production.82 
Set against the legalistic, sovereignty-based definition of the illicit trade was a 
broader definition promoted by European and several Sub Saharan African, Latin 
American and Caricom states, the USA, and NGO advocates and campaigners. In this, the 
use to which weapons are put is more important than the legal identity of the recipient. 
“Illicit” thus means that transfers can be authorised by states, but still be irresponsible 
and thus illegitimate because they contribute to human rights and IHL violations. The 
Africa Group, negotiating on behalf of most of Sub Saharan Africa, initially articulated a 
more state-centric vision of the ATT until “lobbying from African civil society and 
churches, Control Arms and other maximalist states” persuaded them to change position 
and tone to “reflect human security concerns” 83  alongside the demand for a ban on 
transfers to non-state actors. This broader definition resonates with a feminist critique 
of militarism that seeks to make connections between the legal and the illicit: just because 
transfers are authorised does not make them legitimate.  
However, on the flipside, a use-based definition of the illicit trade also means that 
transfers to non-state actors can be argued to be legitimate: for the USA and European 
states, supplying non-state actors is not synonymous with the illicit trade. EU member 
states and the USA already have regulatory systems based on end-use practices, make 
strong normative claims about the consistency between their values and arms export 
policies, and yet also regularly export weapons (to states and non-state actors) that 
violate human rights. 84  The US government (and, less vocally, European states) was 
unequivocally opposed to a ban on transfers to non-state actors (whilst also articulating 
an anti-terrorism position), so as to retain freedom of action in national security and 
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foreign policy, and in line with its redline on controls on civilian possession.85 The ways 
in which this broader use-based definition can be mobilised to both restrain and promote 
arms transfers shows the importance of foregrounding the imperial dimensions of a 
feminist argument. That is, whilst a use-based argument can be mobilised to restrict a 
greater range of transfers by delegitimising those that are authorised but still 
irresponsible, activists need to be alert to the risk of co-option by states who themselves 
have problematic transfer practices and seek to mobilise liberal commitments for 
reputational purposes.86 
The main axis of contestation in the definition of the purpose of the treaty is the 
role of the state in authorising or directing transfers, whether overtly or covertly. In the 
eventual treaty text, the US’ refusal to countenance a ban won out; there is no explicit ban 
on transfers to non-state actors in the treaty. The compromise was that the Preamble to 
the treaty underlines the need to prevent the diversion of weapons to the illicit market, 
“or for unauthorized end use and end users, including in the commission of terrorist acts.” 
This allows states to pursue a narrow or broad definition of the illicit trade, focused on 
use or identity, as they prefer; and to include a ban on non-state actors in their national 
systems if they so wish. This diplomatic fudge suggests that the overall framing of the 
treaty as one designed to combat the illicit and unregulated trade should not be seen as a 
human security victory over militarism, but rather an indication of how one form of 
contemporary militarism has taken human security on board and is in contestation with 
other forms.   
Treatment of human rights and IHL 
If the “illicit and unregulated trade” formulation provides the skeleton for the ATT, 
Articles 6 and 7 form its heart. They set a “floor not a ceiling”87 of basic standards, in the 
form of prohibitions based on international law (Article 6), and national risk assessment 
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processes (Article 7). Weapons transfers that would violate UN arms embargoes or would 
be used in genocide, crimes against humanity or other war crimes, are prohibited under 
Article 6. If a transfer is not prohibited, States Parties wishing to export weapons must 
conduct a risk assessment against a set of criteria that includes IHL and human rights, 
under the terms of Article 7. IHL and human rights standards are now brought together 
in legally binding provisions to cover situations of armed conflict and also non-conflict 
situations; and risks around GBV must be considered when licensing exports.  
The combination of international human rights and humanitarian law being 
applied to weapons transfers is widely considered a major human security victory. Yet 
the human security gains have an ambivalent relationship to militarism. Article 7 
introduces a balancing act into licensing decisions. When conducting a risk assessment, 
the first consideration exporting states are bound by is whether the transfer “would 
contribute to or undermine peace and security.”88 The possibility that an export could 
contribute positively to peace and security is not included in antecedent regional regimes 
such as the EU Common Position, and was inserted at the US delegation’s insistence. 
States Parties still have to proceed to the second part of the test, but the ATT has an in-
built opportunity for them to make a peace and security claim in favour of exports. Under 
the remainder of Article 7, if there is an “overriding” risk of serious human rights 
violations and other ills, states must not authorise the transfer. Again, this language is less 
restrictive than some existing regimes – the EU Common Position language is of 
“significant” risk, for example – and was inserted at the behest of the US delegation, in 
line with its insistence that arms exports are often “vital for the maintenance of peace and 
security.”89 There are a variety of possible interpretations of “overriding” risk in state 
practice: as “more likely to materialise than not,” as “substantial” risk, or as positive 
consequences being outweighed by negative ones.90 Whilst some states may choose to 
act restrictively, the wording was designed to keep the door open for freedom of action 
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by the US, as well as due to opposition to the lower bar of “substantial risk” from the US, 
Russia, China, India and others.91  
Article 7 also includes language about weapons being used to “commit or 
facilitate” human rights and IHL violations, which goes beyond existing national and 
regional regimes and has greater demilitarising potential. The weapons “may be one or 
more steps removed from the actual violation,”92 which means the concept of facilitation 
could open greater space to challenge weapons transfers. This is where the treatment of 
GBV in the treaty becomes especially pertinent. Article 7.4 obliges exporting states to 
“take into account the risk” of weapons “being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of 
gender-based violence or serious act of violence against women and children.” 93 
Objections from some states (notably the Holy See, which has observer status at the UN, 
and Middle East and North African states) led to a “slightly messy compromise” in the 
treatment of GBV.94 Exporting states are required to “take into account” the risk of GBV 
in their national risk assessment process; but exporters are only legally obliged to refuse 
exports if the result of the assessment shows that the risk is of serious violations of IHL 
or international human rights law. Given that many acts of GBV are indeed violations of 
IHL and human rights law,95 most commentators see 7.4 as a win for anti-GBV activism 
as exporters are required to assess GBV risks,96 “mak[ing] it harder for perpetrators to 
access weapons.”97  
Nonetheless, the treatment of GBV illustrates the challenges of addressing 
militarism. Cynthia Enloe describes Article 7.4 as “a transnational feminist success”, 
“buried in [the ATT’s] thirteen pages of formal diplomatic language.” 98  WILPF 
characterises the forms of harm caused by the arms trade in terms of sexual violence, 
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repression and state violence, and homicide and domestic violence.99 Illustrating feminist 
arguments about war as a continuum or a system, this  connects up “domestic” or intimate 
partner violence to war, and “internal” repression and state violence to “external” war, 
exposing what Enloe calls “the causal connections between group armed violence and 
violence perpetrated inside homes and families.” 100  But alongside the inevitable 
diplomatic and bureaucratic politics of implementation, there is the question of how this 
broader feminist, anti-militarist critique could be operationalised, not least because of 
the raising of the bar in the treaty text, such that GBV risks have to constitute serious 
violations of IHL or IHRL to be a reason to deny exports. As Paul Kirby puts it: “is there 
ever a conflict where arms flows could *not* be said to facilitate serious acts of gender-
based violence – harms strongly correlated with, but not necessarily inflicted by, the 
deployment of weaponry? Is the use of white phosphorous ‘gender-based’ because it is 
indiscriminate, and therefore likely to inflict harm on innocent ‘womenandchildren’? … 
Are massacres of battle-aged males by AK-47s gender-based?”101  
A feminist critique that all violence (direct and structural) facilitated by the 
circulation of weapons is gendered and that all weapons transfers have the potential for 
GBV is indicative of the scale of the challenge facing anti-militarist accounts of weapons 
control. It is also indicative of the ongoing obstacles facing “the development of anti-
militarist politics of peace” in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda more 
widely, 102  which has itself demonstrated a “tendency towards militarization.” 103  The 
disappearance of historical feminist commitments to disarmament in the WPS agenda 
represents in part a pragmatic choice by campaigners, but also “exposes the lack of 
compatibility between the ontologies of feminist peace and the state system.”104 
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Diversion and the treatment of ammunition   
A key practice of the illicit trade is diversion, or re-transfer: when weapons do not 
end up with their stated end-user, or are used for an unauthorized purpose. Ammunition 
is particularly susceptible to diversion, because of the quantities in which it is transferred. 
Under a distinct article of the treaty, States Parties are to “take measures to prevent” 
diversion, which can include, but does not require, refusing to authorise exports. 105 
Parallel to this is the treatment of ammunition, also treated under its own article rather 
than being included as a category of equipment in the scope of the treaty. This means that, 
while the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 apply to ammunition, the article on diversion does 
not. So whilst diversion can, technically, be treated as strongly as the other criteria (as the 
provision is there to refuse a licence on these grounds), politically speaking the precision 
of the obligation is weaker than other criteria. In earlier drafts of the treaty text, there 
was no provision for ammunition, in concession to the US.106 Other states also objected to 
the inclusion of ammunition during the negotiations – Russia, China, Canada India, Egypt 
among others – but it was the US that took the strongest line, making repeated and explicit 
proposals to exclude it. Amendments to the eventual treaty text were made to mirror US 
practice as far as possible, and “were part of the compromises made to get the US to vote 
for the final UNGA resolution [to adopt the treaty] and to keep Russia, China and other 
influential states from voting against it.”107  
The ultimate formulation of diversion was constructed predominantly for the US’ 
benefit, against the backdrop of its war in Afghanistan. The US military transfers 
ammunition to the Afghan National Forces, knowing that a proportion of it will inevitably 
be diverted and used against US troops. In 2009, for example, over half of a sample of rifle 
magazines found on Taliban casualties included bullets or cartridges identical to those 
provided by the US to Afghan government forces. There is a strong suggestion that 
ammunition procured by the Pentagon for Afghan forces has been diverted and then used 
against US troops.108The USA accounts for half of the world’s medium and large calibre 
ammunition exports and a quarter of small calibre ammunition exports; it also already 
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controls such transfers under national legislation.109 So the issue is the US refusal to have 
regulation encoded in a multilateral instrument, rather than an unwillingness to regulate 
at all. The US government pressed for, and won, the exclusion of ammunition from the 
treaty’s scope110 and the separate and distinct treatment of diversion. This was despite 
the position of many African, Latin American and Caribbean states that the inclusion of 
ammunition in the scope of the treaty was “essential” for both state and human security 
concerns. 111  US war-fighting – a transnational and asymmetrical practice - and its 
relationship with a key client was thus central to the negotiation of the treaty. While the 
US claims that this is a treaty about bringing others up to its standards, those very 
standards are written in a way to facilitate US war-making and foreign policy practices. 
Exclusion of domestic procurement and civilian possession  
The examples so far have focused on disagreements; yet there was consensus on a 
key silence in the treaty as to what is to be regulated. States’ military spending, arms 
production and domestic procurement are excluded from the remit of the ATT, as is the 
civilian possession of guns.  Superficially, this is unremarkable: the ATT is a multilateral 
arms trade regulation treaty, focusing on international weapons transfers between states, 
rather than a disarmament treaty. States’ sovereign right to determine their own military 
needs and govern their own domestic social relations is a strong counter to the 
development concern over what constitutes appropriate levels of spending or types of 
gun regulation law, and humanitarian concerns over the use of weaponry. Probing more 
deeply, however, we see fundamentally political questions at stake, around the role of 
organised violence in forms of political community and political economy.  
Southern states made the loudest calls for the exclusion of domestic procurement: 
Brazil and other emerging producers insisted on the exclusion of sustainable 
development as a criterion to be included as part of the national risk assessment, on the 
grounds this would intrude on states’ right to determine their own spending priorities. 
Other Southern states challenged asymmetry more directly, with states involved in 
regional antagonism, such as Pakistan and DPRK, criticising the global military imbalance 
                                                          
109 Neil Corney and Nic Marsh, Aiming for Control. The Need to include Ammunition in the Arms Trade Treaty 
(Oslo: PRIO, 2013). 
110  Owen Greene ‘Accommodating the major ‘sceptical’ states in the ATT,’ 27 July 2012, ATT Monitor, 
http://attmonitor.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/accommodating-major-sceptical-states-in.html  
111 Bromley et al, ‘The UN Arms Trade Treaty’, p.1044. 
28 
 
occasioned by western military preponderance (in which western states are able to 
produce a higher proportion of their own weaponry and are thus less reliant on arms 
transfers, and also supply weapons to regional allies, friends and proxies) as the context 
in which debate about arms transfers takes place. 112  This Southern emphasis on 
sovereignty and asymmetry is indicative of the way nation-state militarism is shot 
through with North-South relations: many Southern states have post-colonial reasons for 
insisting on nation-state militarism. The bracketing of domestic procurement means that 
a significant portion of the arms trade is off the multilateral agenda. Yet military 
production is significantly internationalised, even for those states more able to produce 
more of their own equipment; 113  international concern remains primarily oriented 
towards southern states’ practices, though. 
Civilian possession was another US redline, and is the flipside of its position on 
transfers to non-state actors, as well as a good indicator of civil society militarism. The 
sacrosanct character of the Second Amendment in mainstream US debate generated 
ideological hostility from many quarters in the US to the “egregious provisions” of the 
ATT that pose a “pressing international threat to US gun owners.” 114  Pro-control 
campaigners tried to deflect this pressure by reassuring them the ATT was not about 
civilian possession and domestic gun control issues would not be affected by it. 115 
Strategically understandable from the point of view of trying to get the world’s largest 
arms exporter on board with the negotiations, substantively this is a problematic 
position. Civilian gun markets are off the multilateral agenda because the ATT is about 
international transfers: but questions about the adequacy of the regulation of the US 
domestic market are important not only in terms of the racial and gendered politics of 
domestic gun violence, but also in terms of the regional circulation of weapons and their 
role in drug wars and organized crime. The USA has disproportionately high levels of 
firearm-related death and injury compared to other industrialized states.116 More women 
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were murdered by an intimate partner using a gun in the USA between 2001 and 2012 
than the total number of US troops killed in action in the entire wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan combined. 117  And gun violence but also gun control are racialized and 
gendered practices bound up with the very definition of citizenship in ways that are 
challenging for the gun control movement.118  The US civilian gun market also plays a 
major role in regional gun crises in the Americas. Mexico, for example, has some of the 
most restrictive gun legislation in the world and was an early ratifier of the Arms Trade 
Treaty. Yet more than 250,000 guns were purchased in the US and smuggled into Mexico 
between 2010 and 2012, in part facilitated by lax US regulations.119 
Conclusion  
The disagreements and silences of the ATT negotiations demonstrate the ways in 
which weapons circulation and regulation are marked by different forms of militarism. 
The human security agenda has made significant inroads to international public policy 
and social science scholarship, and was an explicit driver of the ATT. Whilst there is much 
in the treaty that optimists see as having the potential to better control the circulation of 
weapons, the argument put forward in this article is that it is a mistake to see the treaty 
as a victory for human security over militarism. Rather, human security has both chipped 
away at some of the most egregious manifestations of militarism, been silent on others, 
and proved to be an accommodation with global militarism in its various forms. Human 
security, political economy and sovereignty came into contestation during the 
negotiations as expressions of different modes of militarism.  
Weapons circulation takes places within a system: there is a world arms market 
(including legal and illicit strands) marked by asymmetry, hierarchy and transnational 
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practices, in which many major exporting states that claim to care about human security, 
in particular European states, already participate in regimes based on ATT-like 
principles. Those that don’t, or are ambivalent about such multilateralism – in particular 
Russia and China, and the USA, respectively – are sceptical about claims made on the basis 
of human rights and IHL. Claims to protect human security disconnect human rights and 
IHL violations from these patterns of military asymmetry and hierarchy, and generate 
resistance from non-liberal suppliers and recipients. So the human security agenda rests 
on the assumption that international politics can remain militarised in one way (the 
absence of efforts at disarmament or tackling military spending or military asymmetry) 
and yet be demilitarised in another (efforts to decrease the likelihood that weapons will 
be used in human rights or IHL violations), in ways that the examples discussed above 
suggest are untenable. Resistance to the ATT from a significant minority of Southern 
states may well be politically ugly, but needs to be understood in the context of 
asymmetry in the world military order, as does US dominance of the negotiations for a 
treaty to which it is a signatory but not a State Party. 
In the desire to promote the spread of human security practices, there has been 
little attention to why an initiative such as the ATT might be resisted, beyond narrowly 
strategic or instrumental concerns or a failure to internalise human security norms. 
Thinking about modes of militarism, and the ways in which the human security agenda 
has transformed, but not necessarily diminished, militarism, can help us think more 
creatively, both analytically and politically, about what is at stake. We need to understand 
and explain patterns of militarism because of the paradoxical role of military power and 
systematic or organised violence in international relations. On the one hand, military 
power has historically been fundamental to the constitution of organised political power, 
be it in the form of the state or otherwise. On the other hand, demilitarisation from 
current levels and forms is a condition for improved human security. A contraction of the 
influence of the “social relations, institutions and values” of war and war preparation on 
social relations, institutions and values more generally 120  reduces the likelihood of 
violent responses to political problems, reduces the secrecy and corruption associated 
with military decisions or military involvement in the economy, and lowers the 
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opportunity costs associated with high levels of military spending, to name a few reasons. 
But militarism has been pushed off the agenda, precisely because it strikes at the core 
issues around war preparation and the constitution of political community and political 
economy, and because the maintenance of coercive capacities in the South is central to 
aid donors’ and Southern elites’ interests, not to mention the entrenched coercive 
orientation of Northern states’ foreign policies. 
For these reasons a human security agenda is limited in terms of its ability to 
generate more restrictive weapons transfer practices. However, it is also deeply 
interested, in the sense of having political effects. Human security has become a dominant 
policy orientation amongst aid donors and NGOs, is eminently fundable by donors who 
claim the mantle of benevolence without wanting to change their weapons transfer 
practices, and has been mobilised in scholarship in pursuit of a normative project.  While 
the practical gains made by any treaty will always be partial, the more significant 
ramification is that the gains made in the ATT help set the parameters of politically 
feasible action, and obscure some of the core political projects that are sustained by the 
circulation of weapons. 
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